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ABSTRACT 
 
This article analyses the redistributive efficiency of public spending and taxation in a panel of 
both advanced and developing economies during the last three decades (1984-2012). In order 
to explore how redistribution is achieved through fiscal policies, a two-stage approach is 
applied. First, we evaluate the redistributive efficiency of public spending and taxes by using 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and obtain considerable variation in redistributive 
efficiency scores across countries. Second, we use panel truncated and OLS regression 
analysis to identify the determinants of these differences and reveal the crucial role of 
economic development, government quality and demographic factors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The fact that income inequality has generally being rising in both advanced and developing 
economies in recent decades (IMF 2014; OECD 2008 and 2011), coupled with the growing 
realization that inequality could be harmful for economic development (Halter et al. 2014; 
Ostry et al. 2014), highlights the need for policies which can reduce inter-personal income 
differences. In this context, the redistributive potential of fiscal policies, both on the tax and 
spending sides, can play an important role.  
The capacity of countries to deploy fiscal policies to reduce income differences faces 
important budgetary restrictions. Developing countries tend to have smaller public sectors and 
thus fewer fiscal resources available to address inequalities (Barreix et al. 2007; Goñi et al. 
2011). And some developed countries have experienced an unprecedented increase in public 
debt in the context of the Great Recession of 2007-09, raising serious concerns about fiscal 
sustainability. Against this backdrop, many governments have been making substantial fiscal 
adjustments through a combination of spending cuts and tax hikes to reduce their ratios of 
debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). At the same time, public support for redistributive 
policies has grown, especially in advanced economies where the crisis has hit hardest (see, 
IMF 2014). 
Because of increasing income inequalities and scarce budgetary resources, attention needs to 
be paid to the redistributive efficiency of fiscal policies: efficiency allows the attainment of a 
given level of redistribution at lower levels of spending and taxes, or the attainment of more 
redistribution at given tax and spending levels.  
A range of studies have used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure the efficiency of 
government spending, either total spending or spending in specific policy areas, in attaining a 
range of socio-economic objectives such as health and education outcomes (see, for example 
Gupta and Verhoeven 2001; Afonso et al. 2005). A number of contributions have gone further 
by, moreover, examining a set of non-discretionary factors which may explain cross country 
differences in public sector efficiency.
1
 Thus, Afonso et al (2010) and Hauner and Kyobe 
(2010) use the DEA methodology to calibrate the efficiency of health, education or social 
spending in the pursuit of specific socio-economic objectives and then explain cross-country 
differences in government efficiency by way of factors which, they argue, are immutable in 
the short run.  
In this article we focus on how efficient fiscal policies are in terms of redistribution and 
examine those variables which determine redistributive efficiency. Of course, different fiscal 
policies can have different objectives such as macroeconomic stability, public good provision, 
economic growth or redistribution. But regardless of their objective, public spending and tax 
policies may potentially impact on the distribution of income (see Woo et al. 2013 and IMF 
2014 for a survey of empirical work). Our interest here is to apply DEA methodology to 
examine the overall impact of fiscal policy on the distribution of income and specifically we 
aim to consider how efficient total spending and taxation are in redistributing income. Having 
done so, we then aim to uncover those factors which might explain cross-country differences 
in the redistributive efficiency of fiscal policy based on panel regression analysis.  
We analyze the impact of public expenditure and taxes since both affect the distribution of 
income (see Martinez Vazquez et al. 2012, Muinelo and Roca-Sagalés 2013, and Wang et al. 
2012 and 2014). Moreover, we consider the impact of fiscal policy on a measure of 
                                                 
1
 This two-step approach is currently the prevailing one the DEA literature (see, Liu et al 2013).  
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redistribution which exploits the difference between market inequality (before government 
transfers and taxes) and net income inequality (after government transfers and taxes) – a 
measure that we fully explain below.  
Our first stage results, based on the DEA analysis applied to a panel of 27 developing and 
developed countries for the period 1984-2012, allow us to identify countries with similar 
spending and tax levels that obtain very different redistributive results signaling important 
differences in redistributive efficiency across countries. Moreover, our second stage results 
obtained from panel truncated and OLS regression analysis, points to the crucial role of 
economic development, government quality and the country’s population structure in 
explaining these differences. The paper is structured as follows. After analyzing the 
redistributive role of fiscal policy in section 2, we explain the empirical methodology and the 
data in sections 3 and 4, discuss the results in section 5 and then conclude the article. 
 
2. Fiscal Policy and Redistributive Efficiency 
Fiscal policy is the primary tool through which governments can affect the distribution of 
income. Both tax and spending policies can alter this distribution, both over the short and 
medium term. The use of regression-based models to study the redistributive impact of fiscal 
policy has grown in recent years. A range of empirical studies have regressed measures of 
disposable income inequality on fiscal policy variables in order to explain their distributive 
impact. In this sense, it is possible to distinguish between two main groups of contributions. A 
first group discuss the impact of fiscal policies on income distribution in OECD countries and 
find a significant negative effect of government spending and taxes on inequality (for 
example, Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-Sagáles 2013) and an especially strong redistributive 
effect coming from public pensions (Huber and Stephens  2006 and Wang et al. 2012 and 
2014). A second group of studies evaluates the distributive impact of different fiscal policies 
implemented in developing countries showing, in general, very weak effects (Chu et al. 2000 
and 2004). Overall, these two lines of work show that the distributive impact of fiscal policies 
is strongly related to the level of economic development and to the specific spending and tax 
policies adopted.
2
 
While this literature provides important insights into the impact of fiscal policies on income 
distribution, it does not evaluate the efficiency of these policies with regards to redistribution. 
Afonso et al. (2010) reports significant cross-country differences in the efficiency of social 
spending in reducing disposable income inequality. However, in order to evaluate 
redistributive efficiency, we cannot simply rely on disposable income inequality. This ignores 
the possibility that the evolution of this measure may also be due to changes in market income 
inequalities which, beyond fiscal policies, may occur because of globalization and 
technological change as well as other policies such as product and labor market regulation 
(OECD 2011). Thus, if we were to assess redistributive efficiency based exclusively on 
disposable income inequalities, this could lead us to assign changes in inequality exclusively 
to fiscal policy and ignore the possibility that these changes may also be due to the evolution 
of market income.  
In this article, we take advantage of the recent income inequality database developed by Solt 
(2009, 2014) that combines information from available surveys to infer comparable series of 
Gini coefficients for market and net income inequality in an extended sample of countries and 
years. Specifically we employ Solt’s (2014) relative redistribution measure which is defined 
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as the difference between the Gini coefficient for market and for net income as a proportion of 
the Gini coefficient for market income.  
Figure 1 about here 
In order to illustrate the usefulness of this measure, figure 1 plots it against net income 
inequality using data from some of the economies included in our sample. It shows that 
economies with similar levels of net income inequality have very different levels of relative 
redistribution. For instance, Sweden and Belgium in Group I, have net income Gini values 
close to 24 but very different levels of relative redistribution, stemming from the fact that 
Sweden has achieved greater reductions in market inequality. Specifically, market inequality 
in Sweden is much higher than that in Belgium (45 versus 32). So obviously, Sweden has 
experienced a significantly larger change in the distribution of income than Belgium. If we 
were to measure the redistributive impact of fiscal policy based on net income inequality, we 
could conclude that this is very similar. If instead we employ the relative redistribution 
indicator which also accounts for market inequality, we may observe substantial differences 
in the redistributive effect of fiscal policies. Similar examples include South Korea versus 
Portugal in Group II and Uruguay versus Sri Lanka in Group III.  
 
3. Empirical methodology 
In this section we detail the DEA methodology used to empirically evaluate the redistributive 
efficiency of fiscal policy, and then explain the empirical approach used to identify the non-
discretionary determinants of this efficiency. 
 
3.1 Data Envelopment Analysis Methodology 
In this study we use DEA to evaluate the efficiency of fiscal policies in terms of income 
redistribution. Efficiency is defined with respect to a production possibility frontier, which 
indicates feasible output levels given the amount of inputs employed. 
When performing DEA analysis several decisions must be taken. One concerns the choice 
between an input or output orientation. Whereas an input-oriented model maintains the 
current level of output constant and minimizes inputs, an output-oriented model maximizes 
output given the amount of inputs. We choose the latter model because we are interested in 
assessing the redistributive efficiency of given levels of public spending and taxation. In other 
words, the frontier methodology applied in this study takes governments as producers 
combining two inputs (public spending and taxes) to obtain one output (measured through 
relative redistribution). Governments are considered more efficient if they produce a larger 
output for given inputs. The DEA methodology translates efficiency into “scores”, and based 
on these scores, one can build ordinal rankings of a country’s relative performance (Coelli 
and Perelman, 1999). Another decision is whether to apply constant or variable returns to 
scale in the production function. Banker et al. (1984) was the first to incorporate variable 
returns to scale (VRS) to account for agents not operating at their optimal scale. We employ 
VRS since our inputs are ratio data and, as explained by Hollingsworth et al. (2003), in that 
case the model with the VRS constraint performs better.  
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The DEA method applies linear programming techniques to input and output data and 
estimates an efficiency frontier.
3
 The general relationship is given by the following 
production function for each country i:  
 
 ii XfY  , ni ,...,1                               (1) 
 
Where, iY is the output index (relative redistribution) and iX includes two inputs (government 
expenditure and taxes, both as a percentage of GDP).  
If  ii XfY  , then the country exhibits inefficiency. That is to say, with the observed levels 
of inputs, the current or observed output (redistribution obtained) is smaller than the highest 
achievable potential output (output-oriented efficiency). Thus inefficiency can be measured 
by computing the distance to the estimated efficiency frontier.  
Analytically, the linear programming output-oriented problem to be solved for country i 
assuming variable returns to scale is as follows (see Afonso et al. 2013). We assume that 
there are k  inputs and m outputs for n  countries. For country i , iy is the column vector of 
results and ix is the vector of inputs. We can define X  as the inputs matrix with dimensions 
( nk * ), and Y  as the output matrix with dimensions ( nm* ). Thus:  
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The efficiency score represented by i , a scalar that satisfies 11 
i
, that measures the 
distance between country i and the efficiency frontier, defined as a linear combination of 
those observations with best practices in the sample. It is important to note that this method 
considers indicators of relative efficiency within the sample of individuals (in our case, 
countries) analyzed.  
If 11 
i
, the country is within the frontier (i.e. it is inefficient), while 1i implies that the 
country is on the efficient frontier (i.e. efficient). The vector is a ( 1*n ) vector of constants 
that measure the weights used to compute the location of an inefficient country if it were to 
become efficient, and 1n is a n-dimensional vector of 1 ones. The restriction 11
' n  
imposes convexity on the frontier. This problem is solved for each of the n  countries for the 
purpose of obtaining n efficiency indicators. 
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 For more details on DEA techniques and analysis, see, for example, Farrell (1957), Charnes et al. (1978), 
Thanassoulis (2001), and Coelli et al. (2002). 
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3.2 Analyzing the non-discretionary factors: a panel data approach.  
The DEA method assumes that output efficiency is purely the result of discretionary inputs 
and as such ignores the influence of non-discretionary factors which may also impact on 
efficiency. To account for this, we perform a second stage analysis where the DEA efficiency 
scores are regressed on a set of possible exogenous factors that might explain redistributive 
efficiency. 
Following McDonald (2009) and Simar and Wilson (2011), the DEA efficiency scores are 
corner solutions meaning that they are truncated. A corner solution variable is continuous and 
limited from above and/or below, and takes the value of one of the boundaries with a positive 
probability (see, Hoff 2007). Because of this, truncated regression provides consistent 
estimations in the second stage of our analysis.
4
 
Thus, we undertake a truncated panel data regression analysis, by regressing the output 
efficiency scores i , on a set of possible non-discretionary factors, Zi: 
  iii Zf                (3) 
In relation to these non-discretionary factors, we include the logarithm of the GDP per capita, 
several indicators of the quality of government, the percentage of population between 0 and 
14 years as a proportion of the population between 15 and 64, the percentage of population of 
65 years or more in proportion to the population between 15 and 64, a measure of asset 
inequality, indicators of educational attainment and unemployment rates and, finally, 
measures of fiscal discipline in the guise of indices of spending and revenue rules adopted by 
the different countries in our sample (we justify the choice of these variables in section 4.3).  
 
4. Data 
In this section we elaborate further on the indicator employed to measure redistribution, and 
discuss the other variables included in the DEA and the subsequent panel regression analysis. 
We construct a panel of 27 high and upper middle income economies taking 6 five year 
periods from 1984 to 2012, basing our selection of countries and time period on the 
availability, frequency and quality of the data.
5
 
 
4.1 The DEA output variable: relative redistribution  
Woo et al (2013) explain the main limitations of the most widely used datasets on income 
inequality in the last decades namely, the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the World 
Income Inequality Database (WIID) of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER, 2008): 
the first dataset suffers from low coverage (in terms of years and countries considered) and 
reduced comparability across countries and years, while the second one is hampered by the 
use of different income definitions.
6
  
Considering this context, we take advantage of a recently updated cross-country dataset by 
Solt (2009 and 2014) that combines data from LIS and UNU-WIDER. This dataset, labeled 
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 It is important to note that the efficiency scores of the DEA analysis are not generated by a censoring process. 
They are fractional data and because of this, Tobit estimation of equation 3 yields inconsistent estimates or, at 
best, estimates similar to those obtained when applying OLS (see, McDonald 2009). 
5
 The panel is almost balanced because it includes 6 observations for 25 countries, and 5 observations for 2 
additional countries. See appendix for the list of countries included (Table A.1), for the summary statistics 
(Table A.2), and for the sources of all the data employed (Table A.3). 
6
 For different definitions of income concepts, see Lustig and Higgins (2012). 
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SWIID, provides information on market and net income inequality in some 174 developing 
and advanced countries from 1960 to 2013. We restrict ourselves to a more reliable sub-
sample of countries. Specifically, we focus on a sample of 27 countries for which we have 
information on redistribution and government spending and taxation, for the six five-year 
periods included in the analyzed time span (1984-2012).
7
 
As previously stated, our chosen variable for measuring redistribution is a relative measure 
defined as the difference between the Gini coefficient for market and for net income over the 
Gini coefficient for market income. Some papers that analyze redistributive policies prefer to 
measure redistribution in absolute terms taking just the difference between both Gini 
indicators (Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005, Wang et al. 2014  and 2012, Thewissen 2014), 
while others consider redistribution in relative terms arguing that the percentage reduction in 
inequality captured by the relative redistribution measure is a better reflection of redistributive 
effort (Bradley et al. 2003, Mahler and Jesuit 2006; Iversen and Soskice 2011; Huber and 
Stephens 2014). For the purpose of measuring the redistributive efficiency of fiscal policy, the 
relative redistribution measure seems more precise. To see this, consider the case of two 
countries with similar public spending and taxation relative to GDP that obtain a net income 
Gini 15 points below the market Gini. But while the first country goes from 45 to 30 (these 
numbers approximate the case of France), the second country moves from 38 to 23 (Norway). 
Measuring redistribution in absolute terms would lead us to conclude that they have been 
equally effective in redistributing income. Employing relative redistribution however 
indicates that Norway redistributes more than France (Norway 0.39, France 0.33).  
 
4.2 The input variables of the DEA 
We include two input variables in the DEA namely, total public spending and total taxes, both 
as a percentage of GDP and taken from the Government Finance Statistics of the International 
Monetary Fund (GFS-IMF). It is important to remark that while the spending variable covers 
almost the totality of non-financial public expenditure, the tax variable represents a clearly 
lower percentage of total fiscal revenues because it does not include non-tax revenues.  
Figure 2 about here 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between both these aggregate fiscal measures and relative 
redistribution for our extended sample of 27 countries and shows a clear positive relationship 
in both cases. This is as expected since, on the one hand, public expenditure includes a variety 
of social expenditures with distributive implications (transfers like pensions or different 
subsidies) and, on the other hand, countries with higher tax burdens tend to have a more 
progressive tax structure. Of course, this figure is silent on the crucial issue of the 
redistributive efficiency of fiscal policies.   
 
4.3 The non-discretionary variables for the regression analysis 
As previously stated, we account for a range of non-discretionary factors that might explain 
redistributive efficiency differences across countries. First, we control for GDP per capita (in 
logs) in an attempt to account for the possibility that wealthier countries may enjoy a higher 
level of redistributive efficiency for a range of observable (but omitted) or unobservable non-
discretionary factors related to development. Next, we control for cross-country differences in 
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 More details on Solt’s database may be found at: http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/swiid.html. Babones and 
Alvarez-Rivadulla (2007) explain some of the advantages of SWIID database while Jenkins (2014) provides a 
comparative analysis between the WIID and SWIID databases. 
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institutional quality – based on perceptions of the extent to which the public sector is free 
from corruption, is endowed with a professional and efficient bureaucracy and observes the 
rule of law, – on the strength of the argument that countries with better quality institutions 
will be endowed with more efficient redistributive policies (Gupta et al. 2002; Rajkumar and 
Swaroom, 2008).
8
 In addition, we control for educational attainment since it has been 
suggested that a more educated populace is likely to demand and be more vigilant of 
government efficiency (Afonso et al. 2010; Hauner and Kyobe, 2010). Moreover, we control 
for land distribution inequality (Gini Land) as a proxy of asset inequality in an effort to 
account for the presence of economic elites who may apply their superior resources to buy out 
public sector agents in order to preserve their privileges and, in doing so, undermine public 
sector efficiency (Glaeser et al. 2003 and Sonin, 2003). Further, we control for the percentage 
of population between 0 and 14 years and, separately, above 65 years of age (both as a 
percentage of the population between 15 and 64), to account for the redistributive effect of 
education spending and health and pensions (see, respectively, Gregorio and Lee 2002 and 
Wang et al. 2012, 2014). Similarly, we control for unemployment rates to allow for the fact 
that for any given unemployment insurance scheme in place, more unemployment implies 
more redistribution (Huber and Stephens 2014). Finally, we control for formal expenditure 
and revenue fiscal rules which can impose a degree of fiscal discipline. The impact of fiscal 
rules is a-priori ambiguous: to the extent that they contribute towards stabilizing a country’s 
fiscal position they may improve redistributive efficiency. Alternatively, they may undermine 
this efficiency insofar as they limit a country’s capacity to respond to exogenous factors.  
GDP per capita, the unemployment rate and the demographic variables are taken, 
respectively, from the Penn World Tables and the World Development Indicators of the 
World Bank. Data concerning land inequality come from the World Census of Agriculture 
series produced by the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). In the case 
of educational attainment, we use an indicator defined as the average years of schooling of the 
population aged 25 and over (Barro and Lee 2014).
9
 
For specific measures of government quality we turn to the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) database as developed by the Political Risk Services Group. The ICRG is based on 
the perceptions of a worldwide network of experts on a range of country-specific variables, 
including corruption, rule of law and bureaucratic quality across state institutions and 
jurisdictions. Because the first two dimensions are measured on a scale from 0 to 6 while the 
last one does so from 0 to 4, we normalize each dimension between 0 and 1. An aggregate 
quality of government indicator is obtained by summing up these normalized values and thus, 
ranges from 0 to 3 where a higher number implies higher government quality.  
To take into account the presence of fiscal rules in different countries we employ two 
different dummy variables referring, separately, to the expenditure and revenue sides. A fiscal 
rule is considered as a long-lasting constraint on fiscal policy through numerical limits on 
budgetary aggregates. These dichotomous variables take the value of 1 in the presence of a 
fiscal rule which sets boundaries on the expenditure or revenue policies that can be adopted 
by the government. The data comes from the International Monetary Fund.
10
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 Controlling for GDP per capita also helps to account further for institutional quality since a country’s wealth 
has been identified as an important factor explaining its institutional quality (La Porta et al, 1999). 
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 This database is available at: http://www.barrolee.com/. 
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 Dataset available at: http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/fiscalrules/map/map.htm. This said, the 
demarcation lines of what constitutes a fiscal rule are not always clear (see, Schaechter et al. 2012). 
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5. Results 
 
5.1 Redistributive efficiency 
 
In table 1 we present the DEA efficiency scores obtained using two inputs (government 
expenditure and taxes) and one output (relative redistribution) for the six five-year sub-
periods. First, we can identify countries whose scores change very little over time (Sweden 
and Brazil), but also countries with important variation in their estimated scores through time 
(South Korea and Portugal). Second, several countries’ efficiency scores are close to the 
production possibility frontier over the whole period (Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and 
Germany) while in other countries there seems to be a large scope for improvement (Italy, 
Greece and Brazil). This can be appreciated in table 2 where we present the potential 
improvements in redistributive efficiency measured as the difference between effective and 
potential outputs. The results reported in both tables show that redistributive efficiency is 
relatively low in non-European and Southern European countries and high in Nordic and 
Central European countries. 
This can also be seen in figure 3 which shows the production possibility curve in two 
dimensions, for the output-oriented case with a single output and two inputs (as before). 
Again, both graphs clearly show that Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and Germany are 
more efficient redistributors, while the opposite is the case for Italy, Brazil, Sri Lanka and 
New Zealand among other countries. 
Figure 3 about here 
The case of New Zealand is, at first sight, surprising. It has high levels of spending and 
taxation, but is far away from the efficiency frontier implying that the public sector is not very 
efficient in bridging the gap between market and net income inequalities. It would be wrong 
however to conclude from this that New Zealand does not affect the distribution of income 
through public policies, including fiscal ones. In our sample, New Zealand has the lowest 
level of market inequality, 35 compared to 31 for net income inequality. This would suggest, 
that government policy may affect the distribution of income there ex-ante, through its impact 
on market income inequality rather than ex-post, from market income to net income. Neither 
our DEA analysis, nor previous ones employing net income inequality as an output can 
account for this. 
Table 1 about here 
It is important to state that the results obtained using two inputs in the DEA differ from those 
obtained when just taking into account public spending (see the last two columns of tables 1). 
The results excluding taxes show lower efficiency scores across all countries and also wider 
differences in redistributive efficiency. In some countries the results change substantially: for 
example, the Netherlands, the United States, Switzerland and Costa Rica experience a 
relatively large fall in their score and ranking when taxes are omitted. Conversely, several 
countries improve their ranking when ignoring taxes including, Portugal, New Zealand and 
South Korea.  
 
5.2 Explaining redistributive inefficiencies via non-discretionary factors: a panel data 
analysis 
Table 3 reports the results obtained using panel data truncated regressions of the estimated 
efficiency scores that appear in Table 1 on the non-discretionary factors presented in section 
10 
 
4.3. In column 1, we report a model that includes the aggregate indicator of government 
quality. Then, in columns 2 and 3 we additionally control for the presence of an expenditure 
or revenue rule, respectively. In columns 4 to 12, we follow the same approach but now 
considering the different components of government quality separately (control of corruption, 
bureaucratic quality and law and order). We find income per capita, the perception-based 
governance indicators, the demographic and fiscal rule variables to have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the efficiency score. On the other hand, the land inequality 
measure reduces the redistributive effectiveness of fiscal policy. We do not find educational 
attainment or unemployment to be significant explanatory variables and since their inclusion 
does not affect the estimated impact of the explanatory variables, we drop them from the 
regressions. For robustness purposes, in table 4 we report the results of OLS panel data. As 
can be seen, changing the estimation method, something which includes a larger number of 
observations, does not alter our results and confirms the sign, magnitude and significance of 
the estimated coefficients. 
Tables 3 and 4 about here 
Our results are suggestive of the importance of development, governance, asset inequality, 
demography and fiscal rules for redistributive efficiency. Richer countries with better 
institutions – the two tend to go hand in hand – seem to be more efficient in redistributing 
income through fiscal policies. Higher asset inequalities reduce redistributive efficiency, a 
result which is consistent with the argument that economic elites may influence public agents 
to avoid redistribution since it is likely to go against their interests. In relation to the impact of 
demographics on redistributive efficiency, both the demographic cohorts included have a 
positive and statistically significant impact on redistributive efficiency. Moreover, the 
coefficient of the older cohort is higher than that of the young one in all the regressions, 
suggesting that public pensions and health expenditures may have a stronger impact on 
redistributive efficiency than education spending. In addition, countries with fiscal rules in 
place do better at redistribution perhaps because of the stabilizing effect of these rules on 
fiscal policy.      
Finally, it is important to consider that because DEA is a data driven approach where the 
scores are obtained by an implicit data-generating process, it is convenient to analyze the 
sensitivity of the estimated efficiency scores to sampling variation (bootstrapping). 
Bootstrapping involves repeated simulations of the data generating process (Simar and 
Wilson 1998 and 2000). Thus, as an additional robustness test, all the efficiency scores 
obtained in the first stage of our DEA analysis are corrected through this bootstrapping 
procedure.
11
 Then, in the second stage or regression analysis, the bias-corrected efficiency 
scores obtained for each of the six five-year means over the period 1984 to 2012, are 
regressed on the non-discretionary explanatory variables using the truncated regression 
model. Employing this bootstrapping procedure does not change our second-stage regression 
results and confirms the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients.
12
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Parteka, 2011; and Varabyova and Schreyögg, 2013). 
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confidence intervals coverage (see Simar and Wilson, 2007). This empirical evidence, as well as the bootstrap 
Stata codes, are not present here, due to space considerations, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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6. Conclusions 
Recent theoretical and empirical work suggests that income inequality could have a negative 
impact on economic development. The redistributive potential of fiscal policy, both on the tax 
and spending sides, can therefore play an important role in both reducing inequalities and 
raising long-term growth. In the context of increasing income inequalities and scarce 
budgetary resources experienced by many countries, attention needs to be paid to the 
efficiency of fiscal policy in redistributing income. Efficiency alleviates budget constraints as 
it facilitates the attainment of greater levels of redistribution at given levels of spending and 
taxation. In this paper, we empirically evaluate the redistributive efficiency of aggregate 
public spending and taxation through the DEA methodology and we then use the efficiency 
scores obtained to analyze the determinants of cross-country variation in efficiency through 
panel regression analysis. Because fiscal policies have other objectives, it is important to state 
that we are not trying to evaluate the efficiency of the public sector beyond redistribution.  
Our first stage results – obtained through the DEA methodology and based on a panel of 27 
developing and developed countries for the period 1984-2012 – reveals important differences 
in redistributive efficiency across countries. Specifically we identify higher efficiency levels 
in the Nordic and Central European countries, while the Southern European and other 
countries display much lower levels and consequently a greater scope for improvement. And 
our second stage results point to the crucial role when explaining these differences of, 
economic development, the quality of institutions and the country’s population structure – in 
the case of the latter, probably because of the redistributive importance of education spending 
and, especially, health expenditures and old age pensions.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A.1 List of countries 
 
Country Code Country 
AUS Australia 
AUT Austria 
BEL Belgium 
BRA Brazil 
CAN Canada 
CRI Costa Rica 
DNK Denmark 
FIN Finland 
FRA France 
DEU Germany 
GRC Greece 
IRL Ireland 
ITA Italy 
KOR Korea, Republic of 
LUX Luxembourg 
NLD Netherlands 
NZL New Zealand 
NOR Norway 
PRT Portugal 
ESP Spain 
SGP Singapore 
LKA Sri Lanka 
SWE Sweden 
CHE Switzerland 
GBR United Kingdom 
USA United States 
URY Uruguay 
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Table A.2 - Summary statistics  
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Observations 
Redistribution efficiency score Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.798 0.204 
0.144 
0.146 
0.170 
0.426 
0.267 
1 
1 
1 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
Relative redistribution Overall 
Between 
Within 
23.886 13.707 
13.409 
3.937 
-11.347 
-3.314 
7.027 
51.180 
48.037 
35.090 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
Log of GDP per capita Overall 
Between 
Within 
9.968 0.674 
0.653 
0.204 
7.485 
7.921 
9.243 
11.000 
10.809 
10.478 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
Government Quality Overall 
Between 
Within 
2.478 0.527 
0.504 
0.163 
1.092         
1.379 
2.049 
3 
3 
3 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
Corruption Overall 
Between 
Within 
4.674 1.078 
0.933 
0.596 
2.033           
3 
2.502 
6 
6 
6 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
Bureaucracy quality Overall 
Between 
Within 
3.521 0.698 
0.708 
0.199 
1.983 
2 
2.780 
4 
4 
4 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
Law and order Overall 
Between 
Within 
5.1600 
 
1.165 
1.119 
0.497 
0.550 
2.207 
3.503 
6 
6 
6 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
Market Income Inequality Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.421 0.054 
0.019 
0.051 
0.272 
0.388 
0.303 
0.563 
0.440 
0.585 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
Net Income Inequality Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.319 0.073 
0.082 
0.072 
0.207 
0.306 
0.216 
0.524 
0.326 
0.531 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
Percentage of Population between 0 to 14 
years over population between 14 and 64 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.305 0.084 
0.073 
0.042 
0.161 
0.221 
0.157 
0.620 
0.507 
0.437 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
Percentage of Population of 65 or more 
over population between 14 and 64 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.196 0.059 
0.057 
0.019 
0.067 
0.084 
0.130 
0.326 
0.270 
0.261 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
Land Inequality Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.575 0.164 
0.165 
0.020 
0.232 
0.259 
0.496 
0.857 
0.855 
0.633 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
Revenue fiscal rule Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.105 0.307 
0.236 
0.201 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
Expenditure fiscal rule Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.308 0.463 
0.342 
0.318 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
Government Taxes (over GDP) Overall 
Between 
Within 
25.693 7.940 
7.338 
3.298 
9.222 
12.722 
11.417 
48.100 
46.938 
44.615 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
Government Spending (over GDP) Overall 
Between 
Within 
36.590 11.567 
9.746 
6.423 
13.255 
16.011 
23.632 
65.915 
48.302 
55.716 
N = 160 
n = 27 
T = 5.926 
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Table A.3 Data definitions and sources 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Market Income 
Inequality 
Gini coefficient based on market income inequality. Solt (2014) 
Net Income Inequality Gini coefficient based on net income inequality. Solt (2014) 
Relative redistribution Market-income inequality minus net-income inequality, divided by market-income 
inequality. 
Solt (2014) 
Government quality Aggregate of corruption, law and order and bureaucratic quality dimensions each 
normalized between 0 and 1. 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as 
developed by the Political Risk Services Group 
Control of Corruption Discrete variable between 0 and 6 points. Assessment of corruption within the 
political system. Lower values imply a higher level of corruption 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as 
developed by the Political Risk Services Group 
Law and Order Discrete variable between 0 and 6 points. Law and Order are assessed separately, 
with each sub-component comprising zero to three points. The Law sub-component 
is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order 
sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as 
developed by the Political Risk Services Group 
Bureaucracy quality Discrete variable between 0 and 4 points. High points are given to countries where 
the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in 
policy or interruptions in government services. 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as 
developed by the Political Risk Services Group 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita in logs (RGDPCNA, 2005 PPP$). Penn World Table 8.0 database 
Government Public 
spending 
Total Expense of general government as a share of GDP IMF Government Finance Statistics 
Government Public 
Taxes 
Public total taxes of general government as a share of GDP IMF Government Finance Statistics 
Population between 0 
and 14 years 
Population between the ages of 0 and 14 as a percentage of the total population. World Development Indicators. World Bank 
Population between 15 
and 64 years 
The number of people who could potentially be economically active. World Development Indicators. World Bank 
Population of 65 years 
or more 
Population ages 65 and above as a percentage of the total population. World Development Indicators. World Bank 
Land Inequality Land holding size and distribution (Gini index) World Census of Agriculture series produced 
by the UN’s Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO). 
Revenue fiscal rule Dummy which takes value 1 if the central or general government or the public sector 
set an explicit limit or target for public revenue in percent of GDP, 0 otherwise 
IMF Fiscal Affairs Department 
Expenditure fiscal rule Dummy which takes value 1 if the central or general government or the public sector 
set an explicit limit or target for public expenditure in percent of GDP, 0 otherwise 
IMF Fiscal Affairs Department 
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Tables and figures to be embedded in the text 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Relative redistribution and net income inequality, by country (averages 1984 – 2012) 
Source: Solt (2014). 
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Figure 2 - Public expenditure, taxes and relative redistribution (1984 – 2012 average) 
Sources: Solt (2014) and GFS (International Monetary Fund) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – DEA Efficiency frontier (1984 -2012 averages) 
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Table 1 – Redistribution efficiency by country (output oriented VRS TE) 
 1984-1988 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003 2004-2008 2009-2012 1984-2012 1984 -2012 
País Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking Technical 
efficiency 
Ranking Average 
Technical 
efficiency 
(2  inputs) 
Ranking 
(Two 
inputs) 
Average 
Technical 
efficiency 
(1 input) 
Ranking 
(One 
input) 
Australia  0.854 15 0.818 16 0.781 16 0.920 10 1.000 1 0.839 15 0.869 10 0.851 9 
Austria 0.870 14 0.762 20 0.785 15 0.908 12 0.810 16 0.812 17 0.825 13 0.763 12 
Belgium 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.896 9 0.924 9 0.912 11 0.936 10 0.945 5 0.900 5 
Brazil 0.605 25 0.434 26 0.516 25 0.396 26 0.275 19 0.328 24 0.426 27 0.322 27 
Canada 0.683 22 0.938 10 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.742 26 1.000 1 0.894 8 0.880 8 
Costa Rica 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.401 24 0.243 25 0.774 17 0.343 25 
Denmark 0.775 19 0.831 13 0.916 8 1.000 1 0.966 5 0.952 8 0.907 7 0.907 4 
Finland 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.958 6 0.950 9 0.985 2 0.967 2 
France 1.000 1 0.801 18 0.836 11 0.918 11 0.904 12 0.838 16 0.883 9 0.787 11 
Germany 0.873 13 0.975 9 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.975 4 0.932 3 
Greece 0.831 16 0.767 19 0.566 24 0.653 23 0.829 15 0.782 18 0.738 19 0.673 18 
Ireland 0.711 21 0.742 21 0.637 19 0.746 18 0.876 14 1.000 1 0.785 16 0.763 13 
Italy 0.625 24 0.600 25 0.568 23 0.655 22 0.701 21 0.689 21 0.640 25 0.604 23 
Korea, Rep. 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.937 7 0.434 25 0.393 25 0.231 26 0.666 22 0.666 19 
Luxembourg 0.973 11 0.991 8 0.842 10 0.856 14 0.913 10 0.908 12 0.914 6 0.880 7 
The Netherlands 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.956 7 0.934 11 0.982 3 0.891 6 
New Zealand 0.629 23 0.661 23 0.597 22 0.730 19 0.674 22 0.649 22 0.657 24 0.647 20 
Norway 0.789 18 0.820 14 0.803 12 0.888 13 0.928 9 0.953 7 0.864 11 0.844 10 
Portugal 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.385 27 0.313 27 0.808 17 0.901 13 0.735 20 0.701 15 
Singapore 0.424 27 0.339 27 0.709 17 0.971 8 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.741 21 0.637 21 
Spain 0.591 26 0.859 12 0.801 14 0.760 16 0.898 13 0.860 14 0.795 14 0.679 16 
Sri Lanka 0.733 20 0.628 24 0.508 26 0.730 19 0.170 27 0.203 27 0.495 26 0.337 26 
Sweden 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Switzerland 0.793 17 0.892 11 0.633 21 0.797 15 0.756 18 0.709 20 0.763 18 0.634 22 
United Kingdom 0.893 12 0.819 15 0.803 12 0.753 17 0.740 20 0.730 19 0.790 15 0.754 14 
The United States 1.000 1 0.803 17 0.694 18 0.613 24 0.931 8 1.000 1 0.840 12 0.675 17 
Uruguay 1.000 1 0.672 22 0.636 20 0.672 21 0.534 23 0.435 23 0.658 23 0.499 24 
Average 0.839 -- 0.820 -- 0.772 -- 0.801 -- 0.780 -- 0.773 -- 0.798 -- 0.723 -- 
Note:  All results are based on one output (relative redistribution) and two inputs (government expenditure and taxes), except the last two columns that are obtained 
using just one input (government spending). 
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Table 2 –Potential improvements in redistribution, by country and period (output oriented VRS TE) 
 1984-1988 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003 2004-2008 2009-2012 
País Effective 
output 
Potential  
output 
Effective 
output 
Potential 
output 
Effective 
output 
Potential 
output 
Effective 
output 
Potential 
output 
Effective 
output 
Potential 
output 
Effective 
output 
Potential 
output 
Australia  34.417 40.286 30.923 37.789 35.166 45.023 35.332 38.390 35.683   35.683   33.828 40.340 
Austria 34.886 40.121 37.257 48.883 38.208 48.678 41.668 45.870 36.573 45.142 38.175 46.989 
Belgium 44.880 44.880 49.190   49.190 45.734 51.027 42.721 46.246 41.882 45.918 45.016 48.084 
Brazil 13.033 21.536 12.663 29.196 13.527 26.235 12.272 30.965 12.229 44.531 14.839 45.270 
Canada 30.495 44.663 34.278 36.526 26.235 35.649 32.267 32.267 32.961 44.393 33.508 33.508 
Costa Rica 5.309 5.309 10.979 10.979 11.101 11.101 9.375 9.375 8.417 20.998 8.810 36.295 
Denmark 38.664 49.903 42.324 50.938 47.181 51.489 49.225 49.225 46.771 48.410 46.923 49.279 
Finland 47.228 47.228 50.528 50.528 54.328 54.328 46.893 46.893 44.363 46.290 45.828 48.236 
France 34.609 34.609 36.656 45.775 39.990 47.850 41.850 45.570 40.717 45.016 39.960 47.685 
Germany 39.335 45.035 42.312 43.410 41.943 41.943 43.722 43.722 43.496 43.496 42.732 42.732 
Greece 31.404 37.782 30.552 39.808 25.787 45.591 28.602 43.816 31.667 38.188 35.172 44.963 
Ireland 35.312 49.699 32.142 43.321 31.610 49.636 31.096 41.662 39.005 44.530 47.131 47.131 
Italy 27.347 43.769 29.317 48.880 28.118 49.518 30.098 45.936 31.860 45.464 33.151 48.080 
Korea, Rep. 16.603 16.603 9.806 9.806 10.242 10.927 8.316 19.173 8.414 21.398 8.344 36.192 
Luxembourg 39.168 40.248 37.900 38.237 39.929 47.432 38.954 45.516 40.818 44.732 42.758 47.081 
The Netherlands 49.770 49.770 43.185 43.185 44.442 44.442 44.718 44.718 42.136 44.063 43.696 46.803 
New Zealand 30.339 48.246 31.743 48.028 30.684 51.400 34.464 47.229 31.273 46.380 31.224 48.101 
Norway 37.277 47.263 40.723 49.661 42.501 52.903 41.678 46.923 43.816 47.192 45.736 48.014 
Portugal 37.500 37.500 36.401 36.401 16.312 42.388 13.688 43.769 35.371 43.773 41.588 46.159 
Singapore 7.969 18.778 4.039 11.927 4.324 6.102 8.065 8.310 8.536 8.536 9.556 9.556 
Spain 14.436 24.409 29.976 34.897 29.662 37.014 29.680 39.065 31.464 35.053 35.467 41.253 
Sri Lanka 17.762 24.223 13.120 20.879 9.880 19.450 10.074 13.798 2.986 17.615 6.834 33.736 
Sweden 49.903 49.903 51.415 51.415 54.204 54.204 47.661 47.661 48.410 48.410 49.279 49.279 
Switzerland 22.798 28.759 25.731 28.839 22.950 36.280 29.393 36.884 30.812 40.782 29.727 41.954 
United Kingdom 38.344 42.948 34.095 41.627 36.895 45.974 11.329 45.863 33.697 45.565 34.994 47.939 
The United States 27.112 27.112 26.379 32.851 25.146 36.230 23.424 38.203 23.511 25.246 26.018 26.018 
Uruguay 20.141 20.141 13.363 19.886 16.483 25.917 17.639 26.241 17.167 32.144 17.748 40.812 
Average 30.594 36.323 31.000 37.143 30.466 39.583 29.785 37.900 31.261 38.850 32.890 42.277 
Average Output 
Difference 5.729 6.143 9.117 8.114 7.589 9.387 
Note:  All results are based on one output (relative redistribution) and two inputs (government expenditure and taxes). 
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Table 3 –Truncated model results (dependent variable: output efficiency scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Log of per-
capita GDP 
0.072*** 
(0.025) 
0.069*** 
(0.024) 
0.064*** 
(0.025) 
0.071*** 
(0.027) 
0.070*** 
(0.025) 
0.062** 
(0.026) 
0.064*** 
(0.024) 
0.061*** 
(0.023) 
0.056** 
(0.024) 
0.053** 
(0.026) 
0.052** 
(0.025) 
0.045* 
(0.020) 
Government 
quality 
0.223*** 
(0.037) 
0.203*** 
(0.035) 
0.204*** 
(0.036) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Control of 
corruption 
-- -- -- 0.574*** 
(0.113) 
0.527*** 
(0.104) 
0.523*** 
(0.106) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 
Bureaucracy 
quality 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 0.604*** 
(0.102) 
0.545*** 
(0.098) 
0.551*** 
(0.100) 
-- -- -- 
Law and order 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.494*** 
(0.106) 
0.441*** 
(0.099) 
0.435*** 
(0.102) 
Gini land 
-0.279** 
(0.117) 
-0.297*** 
(0.114) 
-0.266** 
(0.114) 
-0.305** 
(0.127) 
-0.322*** 
(0.121) 
-0.283** 
(0.120) 
-0.291** 
(0.117) 
-0.309*** 
(0.115) 
-0.278** 
(0.113) 
-0.402*** 
(0.127) 
-0.414*** 
(0.122) 
-0.383*** 
(0.121) 
Pop65 
2.209*** 
(0.451) 
2.425*** 
(0.452) 
2.067*** 
(0.438) 
2.197*** 
(0.486) 
2.447*** 
(0.479) 
2.021*** 
(0.463) 
2.311*** 
(0.454) 
2.509*** 
(0.456) 
2.161*** 
(0.440) 
2.619*** 
(0.500) 
 
2.838*** 
(0.498) 
2.448*** 
(0.480) 
Pop014 
0.982*** 
(0.318) 
1.078*** 
(0.311) 
0.869*** 
(0.306) 
0.583* 
(0.324) 
0.745** 
(0.314) 
0.497* 
(0.306) 
0.945*** 
(0.319) 
1.033*** 
(0.312) 
0.834*** 
(0.307) 
1.177*** 
(0.366) 
1.271*** 
(0.354) 
1.027*** 
(0.350) 
Revenue rule 
-- -- 0.181** 
(0.080) 
-- -- 0.219*** 
(0.085) 
-- -- 0.181** 
(0.081) 
-- -- 0.208** 
(0.091) 
Expenditure 
rule 
-- 0.23*** 
(0.042) 
-- -- 0.143*** 
(0.044) 
-- -- 0.117*** 
(0.042) 
-- -- 0.140*** 
(0.047) 
-- 
Log-likelihood 91.852 96.621 95.140 87.775 93.750 92.239 91.667 95.910 98.875 85.803 90.926 89.316 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. *, **, *** measures statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include a constant (not 
shown). 
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Table 4 – OLS model results (dependent variable: output efficiency scores) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Log of per-capita GDP 
0.067*** 
(0.015) 
0.070*** 
(0.017) 
0.066*** 
(0.016) 
0.064*** 
(0.018) 
0.067*** 
(0.020) 
0.064*** 
(0.018) 
0.063*** 
(0.014) 
0.066*** 
(0.016) 
0.062*** 
(0.014) 
0.055*** 
(0.012) 
0.060*** 
(0.015) 
0.054*** 
(0.013) 
Government quality 
0.204*** 
(0.058) 
0.183*** 
(0.056) 
0.190*** 
(0.058) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Control of corruption -- -- -- 
0.522*** 
(0.153) 
0.460*** 
(0.149) 
0.488*** 
(0.150) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 
Bureaucracy quality -- -- -- -- -- -- 
0.466*** 
(0.168) 
0.411** 
(0.166) 
0.430** 
(0.170) 
-- -- -- 
Law and order -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
0.463*** 
(0.120) 
0.415*** 
(0.115) 
0.426*** 
(0.118) 
Gini land 
-0.136** 
(0.065) 
-0.123* 
(0.069) 
-0.147** 
(0.066) 
-0.141* 
(0.054) 
-0.130** 
(0.056) 
-0.151*** 
(0.055) 
-0.172*** 
(0.060) 
-0.155** 
(0.066) 
-0.183*** 
(0.064) 
-0.226*** 
(0.051) 
-0.199*** 
(0.057) 
-0.232*** 
(0.051) 
Pop65 
1.100*** 
(0.270) 
1.165*** 
(0.261) 
1.077*** 
(0.270) 
0.967*** 
(0.310) 
1.056*** 
(0.298) 
0.942*** 
(0.312) 
1.356*** 
(0.227) 
1.400*** 
(0.223) 
1.311*** 
(0.222) 
1.263*** 
(0.252) 
1.313*** 
(0.240) 
1.228*** 
(0.250) 
Pop014 
0.701*** 
(0.147) 
0.706*** 
(0.141) 
0.657*** 
(0.145) 
0.317* 
(0.182) 
0.363** 
(0.181) 
0.295* 
(0.193) 
0.717*** 
(0.165) 
0.720*** 
(0.151) 
0.665*** 
(0.153) 
0.748*** 
(0.130) 
0.757*** 
(0.115) 
0.692*** 
(0.124) 
Revenue rule -- -- 
0.081*** 
(0.024) 
-- -- 
0.095*** 
(0.022) 
-- -- 
0.092*** 
(0.022) 
-- -- 
0.089*** 
(0.026) 
Expenditure rule -- 
0.084*** 
(0.016) 
-- -- 
0.086*** 
(0.019) 
-- -- 
0.093*** 
(0.015) 
-- -- 
0.097*** 
(0.017) 
-- 
Adjusted R-squared 0.369 0.400 0.380 0.345 0.375 0.362 0.328 0.364 0.343 0.329 0.370 0.344 
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses. *, **, *** measures statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. Regressions use Period SUR weights. All 
regressions include a constant and period effects (not shown).  
 
 
